


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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee



SECOM-D-038

22 February 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Chairman

STAT

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of
Classified National Security Council and
Intelligence Information

REFERENCE: Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Memorandum dated 2 February 1982

1. Action Requested: Your approval of proposals to implement
tasking to the DCI in reference.

2. Background: The President signed NSDD-19 on 12 January
1982, establishing certain procedures to protect NSC and intel-
ligence information, and directing Mr. Clark to implement its
policy guidelines. Strong, adverse press reaction prompted White
House reconsideration of this policy. Current policy is stated in
referenced memorandum, which rescinded earlier NSDD-19 implementation,
dropped all mention of mandatory advance approval at very senior
levels for all contacts with the news media, and softened language
on investigation of leaks. The DCI is now directed to draft pro-
cedures for intelligence similar to those prescribed by Mr. Clark
for the protection of NSC information. Your draft procedures are
to be cleared within the Community and submitted for NSC consider-
ation no later than 15 March 1982, with any dissents noted.

3. Discussion: The first round of proposals on NSDD-19
implementation surfaced a consensus that we should use this
opportunity to tighten control over intelligence information in
a manner that recognizes resource limitations and timeliness
imperatives, and which would give us better tools to resolve

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unauthorized disclosures. We believe that consensus still prevails notwithstanding the softening of White House policy. I attended an NSC Staff organized meeting on NSDD-19 implementation held on 19 February. Nothing was surfaced there indicating that we should change this proposed policy for the Community.

4. Staff Position: Our proposals on implementation of this are:

a. Definition of "classified intelligence information" which is to be subject to strict controls comparable to those for NSC material -- we propose that this be defined as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Operations Directorate Blue Border series material, and, within Defense, special access program information directly related to intelligence (e.g., These types of data are tightly controlled now because of their sensitivity.

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b. Access limitations -- we propose to task NFIB/NFIC members to review their current access and dissemination practices against strict "must know" criteria.

c. Document controls -- we propose to restate current requirements that SCI, etc., material bear cover sheets identifying authorized recipients.

d. Personal accountability and responsibility -- we propose slight modifications of existing procedures on use of nondisclosure agreements. Signature of such agreements is now a condition of access to SCI. Current policy encourages but does not mandate having those agreements include specific prepublication review requirements. The absence of such may blur a signatory's sense of responsibility. Accordingly, we propose mandatory use of nondisclosure agreements containing specific pre-publication review requirements.

e. Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations -- we propose to require Senior Intelligence Officials to conduct internal investigations whenever they determine that SCI, etc., in their custody has been compromised, and to report their determinations to you. Further, we propose that you tell the Community that you will refer significant leaks to Justice, requesting FBI investigation, and that NFIB/NFIC members will need to give the FBI access to their internal investigative

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results when Justice tasks the Bureau to open a case. We also propose that Senior Intelligence Officials be informed that the polygraph may be used in leak investigations.

f. News Media Contacts -- we propose to limit contacts to senior officials on the basis of individual, advance approvals by cognizant NFIB/NFIC members, with the latter to keep you informed of contacts likely to result in publicity. Routine "no comment" responses to press inquiries would be exempted.


5. Recommendation: That you review these proposals and sign the attached ~~draft~~ memorandum to communicate them to the Community for information and comment.

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Attachment

APPROVED:


Director of Central Intelligence

2 MAR 1982
Date

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SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of Classified
National Security Council and Intelligence Information

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